雙語暢銷書《艾倫圖靈傳》第8章:水銀延時線(87)
Alan next turned a little aside from this central idea in order to consider the objection to the idea of machine 'intelligence' that was raised by the existence of problems insoluble by a mechanical process—by the discovery of Computable Numbers, in fact.
In the 'ordinal logics' he had invested the business of seeing the truth of an unprovable assertion, with the psychological significance of 'intuition'.
在序數邏輯學中，圖靈已經看到了不可證明的命題，也認識到了直覺的重要性。But this was not the view that he put forward now.
但這並不是他現在要說的。
Indeed, his comments verged on saying that such problems were irrelevant to the question of 'intelligence'.
實際上，他的觀點傾向於，這樣的問題與"智能"無關。He did not probe far into the significance of Godel's theorem and his own result, but instead cut the Gordian knot:
圖靈並沒有深入考慮哥德爾定理和他自己的結論，他快刀斬亂麻地給出了一個解釋：I would say that fair play must be given to the machine.
我們必須公平地對待機器。Instead of it sometimes giving no answer we could arrange that it gives occasional wrong answers.
如果機器遇到無法解決的問題，我們完全可以讓它給出一個錯誤答案。But the human mathematician would likewise make blunders when trying out new techniques.
人類數學家在研究新問題的時候也會出錯，顯然我們並沒在乎，反而會繼續給他機會。It is easy for us to regard these blunders as not counting and give him another chance, but the machine would probably be allowed no mercy.
但是，機器卻沒有得到這樣的寬容，人們不允許機器出錯。In other words then, if a machine is expected to be infallible, it cannot also be intelligent.
然而，如果我們要求機器是絕對正確的，那麼它就不可能是智能的，There are several theorems which say almost exactly that.
有很多理論可以支持這一點。But these theorems say nothing about how much intelligence may be displayed if a machine makes no pretence at infallibility.
但是這些理論沒有說明，如果機器不故意掩飾其正確性，那麼到底可以表現出何等程度的智能。
