尸位素餐? 非執行董事真的有用嗎

Time is up for non-executive directors. Through successive corporate crises and systemic catastrophes, despite — and in part because of — layers of codes and regulations, independent board members have failed to do the impossible job handed to them by complacent fund managers.

非執行董事的時間已經到頭了。在一次又一次的企業危機和系統性災難中，儘管（在一定程度上也是因爲）有層層監管法律法規，但獨立董事並未能實現那些自滿的基金經理們交給他們的不可能完成的任務。

Here is the charge sheet. Executive recklessness: still untamed. Executive enterprise: often smothered. Executive pay: unchecked. Scandals and failures: recurrent. Sickly corporate cultures: unaltered. Complex operations: unmonitored. Trust in business: fragile.

對非執行董事的“控訴清單”如下：管理層的魯莽行爲仍然未被馴服；管理層的進取心則常常受到壓制；管理層的薪酬依舊不受控制；醜聞與失敗層出不窮；病態的企業文化沒有改觀；複雜的業務操作無人監控；外界對企業的信任非常脆弱。

This list is long. Directors will argue that they are not responsible for all of it. That is precisely the problem. Tighter governance has become the catch-all solution to all corporate, and some systemic, crises, with directors as useful scapegoats if things go wrong. Nobody will weep for people who sometimes earn multiples of average workers’ salaries. But non-executives are under immense pressure as part-time outsiders, overseeing driven full-time experts, who are themselves trying to control companies that are often bafflingly complex.

這是一個很長的清單。董事們將會辯解稱，他們並不對所有這些問題負責。而這正是問題的癥結所在。更嚴格的治理儼然已經成了所有企業危機（甚至某些系統性災難）的萬金油式解決方案，而如果進展不順，董事們可以被方便地當作替罪羊。沒有人會爲薪酬有時高達普通員工數倍的人流淚。但非執行董事作爲非全職外部人士承受着巨大的壓力，他們要監督那些野心十足的全職專家，而這些專家自身也在摸索着控制常常複雜得令人困惑的企業。

A recent US study, “Are Boards Designed to Fail?”, detected many obstacles to proper oversight. They include excessive deference to the chief executive, who often decides when, or even whether, non-executives can visit operations and quiz managers. Then there is the sheer lack of time: here, former executives who boast of “going plural” — taking multiple directorships —should reflect that a singular focus would be more effective, if less lucrative. A new report from Tomorrow’s Company (“UK Business: What’s Wrong? What’s Next?”) suggests the build-up of codes and rules, plus the public’s knee-jerk attacks on directors after a corporate catastrophe, have made boards too risk averse. Separately, the think-tank lists 17 topics, from audit to strategy, on which directors are expected to act in the 30 days a year that is all they usually devote to the job.

美國近期一項名爲“董事會的制度設計是否註定會失敗？”的研究，發現了有效控管面臨的多項障礙。這其中包括對首席執行官的過度服從，首席執行官常常決定了非執行董事何時可以、甚至是否可以走訪企業的運營部門並對經理們提問。此外還有嚴重不足的履職時間：在這個問題上，那些誇耀自己“身兼數職”的前任高管——即同時在數家企業擔任董事——應該認識到集中精力將更加有效，如果對應的報酬會有所減少的話。智庫Tomorrow’s Company新發表的報告《英國企業：哪裏出了問題？接下來會怎樣？》指出，各種規章制度的不斷累積，加上公衆在企業災難發生後對董事們發起的條件反射般的攻擊，導致董事會過於懼怕風險。這家智庫機構另外列出17個領域，從審計到企業戰略，董事們被期待每年花30天時間處理這些領域的事務，這是他們每年通常用於履行職務的時間。

Governance flaws are usually addressed piecemeal. I have written recently about the need to give more weight to remuneration committees, the importance of separating chair and chief executive, the role of independent voices in improving and safeguarding culture. But the moment has come to address the root of the problem.

公司治理方面的缺陷通常是以零打碎敲的方式應對的。近期我曾撰文闡述提高薪酬委員會地位的必要性，由不同人出任公司董事長和首席執行官的重要性，以及獨立聲音在改進和維護公司文化方面所扮演的角色。但現在是時候討論問題根源了。

One former chair and director of a number of small UK companies emailed me to suggest scrapping non-executive directors. “Doing away with most NEDs would make investors face up to their responsibilities,” he wrote.

一位曾在數家英國小型公司擔任董事長和董事的人發電子郵件給我，建議在企業中取消非執行董事。他寫道，“取消絕大多數的非執行董事職位，將迫使投資者直面自己的責任”。

This remedy would appal many (including parts of the FT group) who train, advise, and recruit directors. But investors need the kick. Dodging active ownership responsibility for their cluttered portfolios, “they looked to NEDs to do it for them (at a fraction of [what] they paid themselves)”, the same director writes. Largely, that is still the case.

這副藥方會讓很多培訓、諮詢和招聘董事的人感到驚駭（包括英國《金融時報》的一些部門）。但投資者需要這種刺激。給我郵件的這位董事寫道，投資者逃避對自己凌亂投資組合的積極所有權責任，“他們寄希望於非執行董事代替他們履行這些職責”（而聘請非執行董事的費用只佔了投資者給自己報酬的一小部分）。總的來說，目前的情況仍然如此。

There are exceptions. Norway’s sovereign oil fund is attacking high executive pay, the focus of increasing investor protest worldwide, and plans to sue Volkswagen over its emissions scandal. Shareholders have more regulatory weapons and are using them. A few are putting their own professional representatives on boards to influence strategy.

也有例外的情況。例如挪威的主權石油基金正在杯葛管理層高薪，世界各地聚焦於加強投資者保護，以及投資者在大衆汽車(Volkswagen)尾氣排放醜聞曝光後計划向該公司提起訴訟。股東現在擁有了更多監管武器，並已開始使用它們。一些股東提名自己的專業代表進入董事會，以影響公司戰略。

Stripping out non-executives could tempt executives to revisit the bad habits some showed when their power was untrammelled. Even private equity firms — hardly fans of extraneous bureaucracy — like to appoint directors to oversee companies they own. Executives say they prefer private equity’s hands-on approach to the stifling governance cotton-wool applied by some listed companies.

取消非執行董事或許會導致管理層故態復萌，一些高管在他們的權力不受束縛時顯露過那些壞毛病。即便是私募股權投資公司——這類公司並不喜歡多餘的官僚安排——也喜歡指派董事去控管他們擁有的企業。企業管理層表示，他們更喜歡私募投資公司親自上手參與的方式，而不是某些上市公司採取的像棉絮一樣令人窒息的治理機制。

The US researchers suggest ending the blame game and assembling boards of specialists with relevant expertise to help and challenge chief executives. Tomorrow’s Company proposes that directors engage more closely with shareholders who, in turn, should behave more like stewards of long-term growth, rather than traders.

美國研究人員提出的建議是，終止互相指責的遊戲，組建擁有相關專業技能的專家委員會，由其輔佐和挑戰首席執行官。智庫Tomorrow’s Company建議，董事們應與股東保持更加密切的互動，反過來，股東應該更像長期增長的領路人，而非像交易員。

Another director I know strongly supports non-executives and suggests they are the best guarantors of long-termism. She may be right, in theory. Yet in practice, the merry-go-round of board service, well lubricated at the top level with fees and prestige, leaves few satisfied. Making executives, regulators and investors start from scratch — without the ragged safety net that non-executive directors struggle to provide — would force them to think harder about how to do their own jobs better.

我所認識的另一位董事則強烈支持非執行董事制度，並指出非執行董事是確保長遠眼光的最佳保障。從理論上來說，她或許是對的。但在實踐中，走馬燈一樣不停輪換的董事服務（高層享受優厚的待遇、名利雙收），很少能讓人感到滿意。讓公司管理層、監管當局以及投資者們從零開始——離開非執行董事難以提供的並不牢靠的安全網——將迫使他們更加努力地思考如何把自己的工作做得更好。