負利率是經濟痼疾的表徵而非病因

Almost nine years after the west’s financial crisis started, interest rates remain ultra-low. Indeed, a quarter of the world economy now suffers negative interest rates. This condition is as worrying as the policies themselves are unpopular.

西方金融危機爆發近九年後，利率仍保持在超低水平。實際上，世界經濟的四分之一如今都在忍受負利率政策。這種情況令人擔憂的程度如同這些政策本身不受歡迎的程度。

Larry Fink, chief executive of BlackRock, the asset manager, argues that low rates prevent savers from getting the returns they need for retirement. As a result, they are forced to divert money from current spending into savings. Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, has even put much of the blame for the rise of Alternative für Deutschland, a new nationalist party, on policies introduced by the European Central Bank.

資產管理公司貝萊德(BlackRock)首席執行官拉里•芬克(Larry Fink)認爲，低利率使儲戶無法得到他們退休所需的收益。因此，他們不得不省下當前開支進行儲蓄。德國財長沃爾夫岡•朔伊布勒(Wolfgang Schäuble)甚至把新民族主義政黨——德國新選擇黨(Alternative für Deutschland)的崛起歸咎於歐洲央行(ECB)所實施的政策。

“Save the savers” is an understandable complaint by an asset manager or finance minister of a creditor nation. But this does not mean the objection makes sense. The world economy is suffering from a glut of savings relative to investment opportunities. The monetary authorities are helping to ensure that interest rates are consistent with this fact. Ultimately, market forces are determining what savers get. Alas, the market is saying that their savings are not worth much, at least at the margin.

“拯救儲戶”是資產管理公司或債權國財長口中合乎情理的訴求。但這並不意味着反對低利率就言之有理。世界經濟正遭受儲蓄過剩（相對於投資機會）的困擾。貨幣當局正在幫助確保利率水平符合這一事實。最終，市場力量將決定儲戶得到什麼。可惜，市場正在發出的信號是，他們的儲蓄並不是很有價值，至少就邊際回報而言。

Why does such a savings glut exist? That is the important question. Given its current account surplus of almost 9 per cent of gross domestic product — that is, savings far in excess of what it absorbs domestically, even at ultra-low interest rates — Germany might ask what its domestic interest rate would be if it had to absorb this glut at home. Unfortunately, the rest of the world cannot absorb these savings easily either.

爲何會出現如此規模的儲蓄過剩？這是一個重要問題。鑑於德國經常賬戶盈餘佔國內生產總值(GDP)的近9%——也就是說，即便利率處於超低水平，儲蓄還是遠遠超出了國內可以吸納的數量——德國或許應該問：如果不得不在國內吸納這些過剩儲蓄的話，其國內利率將低到什麼程度？遺憾的是，世界其他地區也無法輕易地吸納這些儲蓄。

The savings glut (or investment dearth, if one prefers) is the result of developments both before and after the crisis. Even before 2007, real long-term interest rates were in decline. Since then, weak private investment, reductions in public investment, a slowing trend growth of productivity and the debt overhangs bequeathed by the crisis have interacted to lower the equilibrium real rate of interest. For a while, strong post-crisis demand in emerging economies partially offset these trends. But now that has also faded away.

儲蓄過剩（如果喜歡的話，也可以稱之爲投資不足）是金融危機之前與之後形勢發展共同作用的結果。即使在2007年之前，實際長期利率也已經處於下滑狀態。自那以來，私人投資疲軟、公共投資削減、生產率趨勢增長放緩以及金融危機遺留下來的鉅額債務相互作用，拉低了均衡實際利率。一段時間裏，後危機時代新興經濟體的強勁需求部分地抑制了這些趨勢。但如今，這部分需求也已逐漸減退。

Some will object that the decline in real interest rates is solely the result of monetary policy, not real forces. This is wrong. Monetary policy does indeed determine short-term nominal rates and influences longer-term ones. But the objective of price stability means that policy is aimed at balancing aggregate demand with potential supply. The central banks have merely discovered that ultra-low rates are needed to achieve this objective.

有人或許會表示反對，認爲實際利率下降完全是貨幣政策而非市場力量的結果。這是不對的。貨幣政策的確可以決定短期名義利率，並影響長期利率。但穩定價格的目標意味着，貨幣政策旨在實現總需求與潛在供給的平衡。各國央行只是發現，需要超低利率才能實現這一目標。

Another objection is that ultra-low, even negative, real rates are counterproductive, even in terms of demand. One rejoinder to this argument is that the ECB raised rates in 2011, with disastrous results. The broader objection is that higher rates shift incomes from debtors to creditors. It is highly likely that the former would cut spending more than the latter would raise it. Furthermore, by impairing the creditworthiness of borrowers, the policy would have two further malign effects: it would force borrowers into bankruptcy, with bad consequences for intermediaries and creditors; and it would reduce the expansion of credit. Thus, the argument that raising interest rates would be expansionary is highly implausible. Naturally, savers argue the opposite. They would, wouldn’t they?

另一種反對意見是，超低甚至負實際利率會產生與預期相反的結果——甚至在需求方面。對這種觀點的一種反駁是，2011年歐洲央行提高了利率，但帶來了災難性後果。更廣泛的反駁是，較高利率將收入從債務人轉移至債權人。它很有可能使債務人削減的支出超過債權人提高的支出。此外，高利率政策會損害借款人的信用度，進一步帶來兩大惡果：迫使借款人破產，給中介機構和債權人都帶來痛苦的結果；使信貸擴張放緩。因此，提高利率可以刺激經濟擴張的說法非常站不住腳。當然，儲戶認爲恰恰相反。他們會提出相反的觀點，不是嗎？

In brief, we must regard ultra-low rates as symptoms of our disease, not its cause. Yet it is right to question whether the monetary treatment employed is the best one. Here, three points can be made. One is that, given the nature of banking institutions, negative rates are unlikely to be passed on to depositors and, if so, are likely to damage the banks. A second is that there is a limit to how negative rates can go without limiting the convertibility of deposits into cash. Finally, for these reasons, this policy might do more damage than good. Even supporters agree there are limits.

簡言之，我們必須把超低利率視作經濟痼疾的表徵，而非病因。當然，人們有理由質疑當前所採取的貨幣療法是否是最佳療法。這裏可以講三點。首先，鑑於銀行機構的性質，負利率不大可能傳遞到儲戶身上，同時，如果是這樣的話，負利率很可能讓銀行遭受損失。第二，如果不限制將存款兌換成現金的話，負利率政策會有一個極限。最後，由於這些原因，這一政策的結果可能會弊大於利。即便負利率的支持者也認可存在侷限。

It is possible to answer such criticisms. Nevertheless, such an exceptional policy could undermine confidence more than strengthen it. Would this mean monetary policy is exhausted? Not at all. Monetary policy’s ability to raise inflation is essentially unlimited. The danger is rather that calibrating monetary policy is more difficult the more extreme it becomes. For this reason, fiscal policy should have come into play more aggressively. Indeed, it is hard to understand the obsession with limiting public debt when it is quite as cheap as it is today.

可以對此類批評進行迴應。然而，如此特殊的政策可能會削弱而非加強信心。這意味着貨幣政策正在耗盡嗎？完全不是。貨幣政策提高通脹的能力實際上是無限的。更準確地說，危險在於，貨幣政策變得越極端，對其進行校準就越困難。因此，財政政策本應更積極地發揮作用。實際上，在借債成本像如今這樣低的時候，很難理解爲什麼要癡迷於限制公共債務。

The best policies would be a combination of raising potential supply and sustaining aggregate demand. Important elements would be structural reforms and aggressive monetary and fiscal expansion. The International Monetary Fund argues that structural reforms work best in such an expansionary context. This is particularly true of labour market reforms. The US has been more successful in delivering a more balanced set of policies than the eurozone.

最好的政策是將提升潛在供給和維持總需求結合起來。重要的手段包括結構性改革、積極的貨幣和財政擴張政策。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)認爲，在積極的貨幣和財政擴張政策背景下，結構性改革可以取得最好效果。對勞動力市場改革而言，尤其如此。美國在出臺更加平衡的政策組合方面比歐元區做得更加成功。

Germany always has the option of abandoning the euro. But the outcome would be a huge appreciation of the recreated D-Mark, losses on foreign assets, in domestic terms, a damaged financial sector, accelerated outward investment, deflation and hollowed-out manufacturing. Alternatively, Germany could stay inside the eurozone. But it must understand that its monetary policy cannot be for the benefit of creditors alone. A policy that stabilises the eurozone must help the debtors, too. Furthermore, the overreliance on monetary policy is a result of choices, particularly over fiscal policy, on which Germany has strongly insisted. It is also the result of excess savings, to which Germany has substantially contributed. It should stop complaining about the ECB’s attempts to deal with these dilemmas and help fix problems it has, in part, itself created.

德國一直擁有放棄歐元的選項。但結果將是重新啓用的德國馬克巨幅升值、以本幣衡量的外匯資產發生損失、金融部門受損、對外投資加快、通縮、以及製造業空心化。或者，德國可以留在歐元區。但它必須明白，其貨幣政策不能只爲了債權人的利益。穩定歐元區的政策必須也要幫助債務人。此外，對貨幣政策的過度依賴是選擇的結果，尤其與德國強烈支持的財政政策兩相比較進行選擇的結果。這種過度依賴也是過度儲蓄的結果，而德國對過度儲蓄的貢獻巨大。德國應當停止抱怨歐洲央行解決這些困境的努力，而着手幫助解決一定程度上由德國自身製造的問題。