伊朗銀行業困境令中國卻步 China Iran banking blight awaits clean slate

US penalties handed down on ZTE, the Chinese telecoms giant, are a reminder that despite January’s partial lifting of sanctions on Iran after UN nuclear inspections, they can still bite.

美國對中國電信巨頭中興通訊(ZTE)的處罰提醒人們，儘管在聯合國(UN)核視察之後，對伊朗的制裁在1月已經部分解除，但制裁依然具有殺傷力。

Previously, the Bank of Kunlun, set up to handle oil for loans and infrastructure deals between Beijing and Tehran during the embargo, had been cited for violations. Chinese commercial and policy banks nonetheless were gearing up last year for legal business, supported by a flurry of official initiatives. China’s “One-Belt One-Road” outward investment campaign envisions a tenfold increase in Sino-Iranian economic engagement over the next decade to $500bn; Iran took a tiny 2 per cent founding share in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank; and the countries discussed bilateral currency swap lines. However, the early optimism has evaporated as terms are worked out for handling contract arrears for $20bn in unblocked Iranian funds in Chinese accounts, and mainland banks, with their own worsening bad loan problems, come to grips with the severity of Iran’s financial system crisis flagged both by President Hassan Rouhani and newly elected reformist parliamentarians.

此前，崑崙銀行(Bank of Kunlun)被列入違反禁運規定者名單。該銀行的成立是爲了處理伊朗遭禁運期間，伊朗和中國之間的石油換貸款和基礎設施協議。儘管如此，在一系列官方倡議的支持下，中國的商業銀行和政策性銀行去年就在爲兩國間的合法業務往來做準備了。按照中國“一帶一路”(One Belt, One Road)對外投資計劃的構想，中伊經濟往來在接下來10年將增加至5000億美元，是現在的10倍；伊朗認繳了亞投行(AIIB)不到2%的初始股本；中伊兩國還商討了設立雙邊貨幣互換額度。然而，隨着雙方就如何處理伊朗資金解禁後，中方賬戶中的200億美元合同欠款商議條款，以及隨着自身壞賬問題日益惡化的中國內地銀行，逐漸理解了伊朗金融體系危機的嚴重性，最初的樂觀煙消雲散。伊朗總統哈桑•魯哈尼(Hassan Rouhani)和新當選的改革派議員，都曾提醒人們注意伊朗金融體系危機的嚴重性。

Beijing faces new banking and trade competition post-sanctions from Europe, and from Asian rivals India, Japan and Korea, which have mobilised their own state and export-import lenders.

對伊朗的制裁解除後，中國在銀行業務和貿易上面臨着新的競爭，有來自歐洲的競爭，還有來自印度、日本和韓國等亞洲競爭對手（這些國家都出動了各自的國有銀行和進出口銀行）的競爭。

Iranian banks were reconnected to the SWIFT international payments network in February, and China’s ICBC has applied for both local and Kish Island free trade zone licenses. Iranian government-owned counterparts are reactivating their Chinese presence, and smaller private sector players like Bank Pasargad have announced plans for mainland establishment. Chinese fund managers have been regular visitors to the Tehran Stock Exchange, where the index gained over 20 per cent through February on doubled daily $100m trading volume and an average six times price-earnings ratio.

2月，伊朗的銀行重新連入環球銀行金融電信協會(SWIFT)支付網絡，中國的工商銀行(ICBC)申請了伊朗本土和基什島(Kish Island)自由貿易區的經營牌照。伊朗政府下屬的銀行正在重啓它們在中國的業務，Bank Pasargad等較小型的私有銀行也宣佈了在中國內地設立分支的計劃。中國的基金管理公司近來是德黑蘭證交所(Tehran Stock Exchange)的常客，在整個2月份，德黑蘭證交所的指數上漲逾20%，日交易額增加了一倍，至1億美元，平均市盈率爲6倍。

However, Iran’s economy and banking system remain in a vice after sanctions relaxation, and their predicament has been underscored by lower oil prices and higher analytical scrutiny despite a paucity of current, reliable official statistics.

然而在制裁放鬆後，伊朗的經濟和銀行體系依然不景氣。油價走低、以及更密切的分析性檢視（儘管缺乏實時可靠的官方統計數據），更凸顯出伊朗的困境。

GDP growth may barely register for the fiscal year ending in March, and a future rebound will not offset consecutive years of recession. Inflation remains in low double digits, an improvement from former 40-50 per cent levels, partially due to exchange rate stabilisation. The formal and parallel markets, respectively at 30,000 rial and 35,000 rial to the dollar, are scheduled to be unified in September according to the IMF, but the timetable has routinely slipped. Fiscal and monetary policies, which had narrowed the budget deficit with subsidy cuts and squeezed inflation with 25 per cent interest rates, were again loosened in an October “emergency” stimulus package. It earmarked $2.5bn for small business projects and lowered bank reserve requirements to 10 per cent, while offering discounted consumer credit lines for autos and housing.

截至3月的這一財年裏，伊朗的國內生產總值(GDP)增長可能幾乎爲零，未來的反彈也無法抵消持續數年的衰退。通脹之前處於40%-50%的水平，部分由於匯率企穩，通脹如今有所改善，但依然處於較低的雙位數。正式市場和平行市場的匯率分別處於1美元兌3萬里亞爾和3萬5里亞爾的水平，根據國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的說法，兩個市場將在9月實現統一，但這一時間表一再推後。伊朗的財政政策和貨幣政策在去年10月份的一項“緊急”刺激方案中再次放鬆，此前這些政策通過削減補貼減少了財政赤字，並通過實行25%的利率壓低了通脹率。伊朗還爲小企業項目劃撥了25億美元，將銀行存款準備金率下調至10%，同時爲汽車和房產提供優惠消費信貸額度。

Iranian banks, particularly the lumbering state-run giants that dominate, urgently need balance sheet repair in the view of the IMF’s December Article IV report. They are supposed to follow dated Basel I prudential standards, but the central bank lacks oversight and resolution powers and proper accounting and classification norms. Reported capital adequacy at around 5 per cent of assets is less than half of Iran’s Middle East neighbours, and the 15 per cent rate of non-performing loans is widely believed to be understated by as much as half.

根據IMF去年12月份發佈的年度“第四條款磋商”(Article IV Consultations)報告，伊朗的銀行，尤其是那些占主導地位、笨重的大型國有銀行，迫切需要修復資產負債表。伊朗的銀行須遵循過時的《巴塞爾協議I》(Basel I)中的審慎標準，但伊朗央行缺乏監督和決議能力，也欠缺完善的會計和分類規範。伊朗報告的資本充足率約爲5%，這不到伊朗的中東鄰國的一半，其報告的15%的不良貸款率被廣泛認爲低估程度高達一半。

Banks must pay off previous long-term deposits of 20 per cent plus and thus widely try to evade loan rate caps by punitive charges on business borrowers. The value of their non-credit portfolios, mainly in property, has also slumped and they are to divest these holdings over the next three years under new rules. The preliminary cleanup cost for the $450bn industry is likely in the $50bn-plus range. Basic banking law amendments, designed to update guidelines and bring unsupervised intermediaries into the fold, will be debated in the next parliamentary session. The lawmakers will also consider setting up a central bad asset disposal agency, and further debt market development after pilot issuance of sukuk Treasury bills in 2015.

伊朗的銀行必須償還此前超過20%的長期存款，因此普遍嘗試通過對商業借款人收取極高的費用以規避貸款利率上限。銀行的非信貸資產組合主要在房地產領域，這些資產組合的價值也大幅下滑，根據新規要求，伊朗的銀行要在接下來3年剝離這些資產。對總值4500億美元的伊朗銀行業而言，初步的清理成本可能在500億美元以上。基本銀行業法律修正案將在下一次議會會議上進行辯論，這些修正案旨在更新指導方針，並將不受監督的中介機構納入監督。立法者還在考慮設立一家不良資產集中處置機構，並繼2015年試發行伊斯蘭國債後加大債券市場開發。

The Chinese are closely monitoring these developments and have been cautious about deeper banking and securities ties since the Geneva agreement opening. They know local financial institutions are in trouble, and the absence of anti-money laundering and terror funding frameworks poses residual global penalty risks. Stock exchange-listed banks continue to lag the rally with earnings declines, and international fund launches have come exclusively from Europe despite a parade of mainland investors surveying potential.

中國正密切關注着這些動向。自關於伊朗問題的日內瓦協議達成以來，中國就一直對與伊朗加深銀行業和證券方面的聯繫保持謹慎態度。中國明白伊朗本土金融機構深陷困境，而且反洗錢和反資助恐怖主義框架的缺失導致遭到國際處罰的風險仍然殘留。伊朗的銀行盈利下滑，銀行股的表現仍然落後於大盤的反彈。雖然有大量中國內地的投資者對伊朗的潛力進行調查研究，但是國際基金的發行完全來自於歐洲。

Chinese ratings agencies have expressed interest in an initial sovereign assessment but demurred so far, like their big three international counterparts. Even with different creditworthiness approaches, quasi-sovereign banking liabilities alone will dictate low junk status until Iranian authorities sanction a wind-up programme on that sensitive issue.

和三大國際同行一樣，中國的評級機構已經表達了對伊朗進行初步主權評估的興趣，但迄今還在猶豫。就算使用不同的信用評估方法，僅準主權銀行債務一點就能將伊朗劃入垃圾級，除非伊朗當局針對這一敏感問題批准一項處置計劃，否則情況無法改變。